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Abstract
We revisit one of the most basic and widely applicable techniques in the literature of dif-
ferential privacy – the sparse vector technique [Dwork et al., STOC 2009]. Loosely speaking,
this technique allows us to privately test whether the value of a given query is close to what
we expect it would be (w.r.t. the input database), where we are allowed to test an unbounded
number of queries as long as their value is indeed close to what we expected. After the first
time in which this is not the case, the process halts. We present a modification to the sparse
vector technique that allows for a more fine-tuned privacy analysis. As a result, in some cases
we are able to continue with the process of testing queries even after the first time in which the
value of the query did not meet our expectations.
We demonstrate our technique by applying it to the shifting heavy-hitters problem: On every
time step, each of n users gets a new input, and the task is to privately identify all the current
heavy-hitters. That is, on time step i, the goal is to identify all data elements x such that
many of the users have x as their current input. We present an algorithm for this problem with
improved error guarantees over what can be obtained using existing techniques. Specifically,
the error of our algorithm depends on the maximal number of times that a singe user holds a
heavy-hitter as input, rather than the total number of times in which a heavy-hitter exists.
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1 Introduction
Differential privacy [10] is a mathematical definition for privacy, that aims to enable statistical
analyses of databases while providing strong guarantees that individual-level information does not
leak. More specifically, consider a database containing data pertaining to individuals, and suppose
that we have some data analysis procedure that we would like to apply to this database. We say
that this procedure preserves differential privacy if no individual’s data has a significant effect on
the distribution of the outcome of the procedure. Intuitively, this guarantees that whatever is
learned about an individual from the outcome of the computation could also be learned with her
data arbitrarily modified (or without her data). Formally,
Definition 1.1 ([10]). A randomized algorithm A is (ε, δ)-differentially private if for every two
databases S, S′ that differ on one row, and every set of outcomes F , we have
Pr[A(S) ∈ F ] ≤ eε · Pr[A(S′) ∈ F ] + δ.
Over the last decade, we have witnessed an explosion of research on differential privacy, and by
now it is largely accepted as a gold-standard for privacy preserving data analysis. One of the main
properties that helped propel differential privacy to its current state is that differential privacy is
closed under composition [12]. This important property allows the design of differentially private
algorithms to be modular: One can design complex differentially private algorithms by combining
several (existing) differentially private algorithms and using them as subroutines. However, the
downside with composition is that it degrades the privacy guarantees. Specifically, composing k
differentially private algorithms degrades the privacy guarantees by (roughly) a factor of
√
k. As
a result, there are cases in which directly applying composition theorems is not the way to obtain
the best results, and different techniques are needed. In this work we revisit one of the most basic
(and widely applicable) of these techniques, known as the sparse vector technique [11].
The sparse vector technique. Consider a large number of counting queries f1, . . . , fm : X →
{0, 1}, which are given one by one to a data curator holding a database S ∈ Xn. In every round, we
would like to receive, in a differentially private manner, an approximation to fi(S) ,
∑
x∈S fi(x).
(A counting query asks for the number of records in S that satisfy a given predicate, e.g., the
number of individuals with blue eyes and diabetes.) This task can be solved by answering each
query in a differentially private manner (by adding an appropriately sampled noise), and using
composition theorems to argue about the overall privacy guarantees. Due to the costs incurred by
composition, this approach requires a database of size n &
√
m in order to answer m such counting
queries. In many cases, however, we might only be interested in obtaining answers for the queries
fi whose answers are “meaningful”. More specifically, we have some threshold t in mind, and we
only care to receive answers to queries s.t. fi(S) ≥ t. Dwork, Naor, Reingold, Rothblum, and
Vadhan [11] presented a simple (and elegant) tool for such a scenario – algorithm AboveThreshold.
This algorithm is capable of identifying (and answering) the first meaningful query from a stream
of queries, while privately ignoring all the (non-meaningful) queries that came before it. The key
observation of Dwork et al. is that privately ignoring the non-meaningful queries comes (essentially)
for free. Informally, algorithm AboveThreshold can be described as follows (see Section 2 for a
precise description).
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Algorithm AboveThreshold (informal)
Input: Database S, threshold t, and a stream of counting queries fi : X → {0, 1}.
1. Let tˆ← t+Noise.
2. In each round i, when receiving a query fi, do the following:
(a) Let fˆi ← fi(S) + Noise.
(b) If fˆi ≥ tˆ, then output ⊤ and halt.
(c) Otherwise, output ⊥ and proceed to the next iteration.
Once algorithm AboveThreshold identifies a “meaningful” query (and halts), estimating the
value of this “meaningful” query can be done using standard differentially private noise addition
techniques. In addition, by re-executing the algorithm after every such meaningful query (and using
composition theorems to argue about the overall privacy guarantees), we can answer c meaningful
queries (out of a stream of m queries) using a database of size n = O˜ (
√
c · logm). When the
number of meaningful queries c is much smaller than the total number of queries m (hence the
name sparse vector), this technique achieves a dramatic improvement compared to what we get
when answering all queries. The sparse vector technique has proven itself to be one of the most
important tools in the literature of differential privacy, with many applications (e.g., [16, 9, 25, 24,
20, 19, 17, 5, 3, 8, 21, 1, 2, 28, 7, 29, 23, 27, 18, 26, 13, 4]).
1.1 Our contributions
As we mentioned, algorithm AboveThreshold of Dwork et al. can be thought of as a technique
for bypassing composition barriers (because instead of answering non-meaningful queries, paying
in composition, we “privately ignore” them for free). However, in order to answer c meaningful
queries, we still use composition theorems when we re-execute the algorithm after every meaningful
query. Do we lose something with this approach?
We present a variant of the algorithm AboveThreshold in which this transition between one
meaningful query to the next is done “more smoothly”, without re-executing the algorithm. While
we cannot avoid the composition cost altogether, we account for it in a more fine-tuned way, which,
in some cases, leads to a significant improvement. Recall that using algorithm AboveThreshold
we can answer c meaningful queries (out of a stream of m queries) using a database of size n =
O˜ (
√
c · logm). Loosely speaking, with our algorithm, the factor √c in the requirement on the
database size is replaced with
√
k∗, where k∗ is the maximum number of times in which a single
record in the database contributes to a “meaningful” answer. That is,
k∗ = max
x∈S
|{i : fi(S) ≥ t and fi(x) = 1}| .
Note that k∗ is always at most c = |{i : fi(S) ≥ t}|, and that it can be significantly smaller than c.
Our algorithm. At its most basic form, our algorithm can be informally described as follows.
We remark that this presentation is oversimplified, and does not capture the full generality of our
algorithm (in particular, the connection to k∗, mentioned above, will only become clear later).
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Algorithm ThresholdMonitor (simplified)
Input: Database S, threshold t, and a stream of counting queries fi : X → {0, 1}.
1. In each round i, when receiving a query fi, do the following:
(a) Let fˆi ← fi(S) + Noise.
(b) If fˆi < t, then output ai = ⊥.
(c) Otherwise, output ai = ⊤ and delete from S every x such that fi(x) = 1.
This algorithm differs from algorithm AboveThreshold in two main aspects: First, instead of
halting after the first ⊤, the algorithm deletes all input elements x ∈ S who “contribute” to the
query that generated this⊤, (that is, all x ∈ S such that fi(x) = 1) and continues. (This will later be
relaxed even further.) Second, we do not add noise to the threshold t itself, only to the values of the
queries. This modification makes it easier to implement the algorithm in a distributed setting, e.g.,
using secure multiparty computation. Specifically, the standard AboveThreshold algorithm begins
by adding noise to the threshold t itself, and the noisy value of the threshold must remain hidden.
In other words, algorithm AboveThreshold maintains a secret state that cannot be revealed. In
a distributed implementation of AboveThreshold, we have to distribute this secret state to the
participating parties (such that no single party knows the state explicitly). In addition, it is not
clear how to address parties that join or leave the computation midway through. In contrast, our
algorithm does not maintain a secret state, and therefore is simpler to implement in a distributed
fashion.
The shifting heavy-hitters problem. We demonstrate our technique by applying it to the
shifting heavy-hitters problem. In this problem there are n users, a data domain X, and a threshold
parameter t. On every time step i ∈ [m], every user j gets an input xi,j ∈ X, and the goal is to
report all the current heavy-hitters. That is, on time step i, the goal is to identify all data elements
x such that there are at least t users whose current input is x. We present an algorithm for
this problem with improved error guarantees over what can be obtained using existing techniques.
Specifically, the error of our algorithm depends on the maximal number of times that a singe user
holds a heavy-hitter as input, rather than the total number of times in which a heavy-hitter exists.
1.2 Technical overview
We give here an informal (and simplified) presentation of the privacy analysis of ThresholdMonitor.
Any informalities made hereafter will be removed in the sections that follow.
Fix two neighboring databases S and S′ = S∪{x′}, and consider the execution of (the simplified)
algorithm ThresholdMonitor on S and on S′. Observe that once we reach an iteration i∗ in which
ai∗ = ⊤ and fi∗(x′) = 1 then x′ is deleted from the data (during the execution on S′). After this
iteration, we have that S and S′ are identical, and the two executions proceed exactly the same.
Moreover, time steps i ≤ i∗ in which fi(x′) = 0 are also not very interesting, since in these time
steps we have that fi(S) = fi(S
′), and so the two executions behave the same.
Therefore, for the privacy analysis, we only need to argue about time steps i ≤ i∗ such that
fi(x
′) = 1. At a high level, we partition these time steps into two sets:
Ifar = {i ≤ i∗ : fi(x′) = 1 and fi(S)≪ t}, and Ialmost = {i ≤ i∗ : fi(x′) = 1} \ Ifar.
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We show that, essentially, time steps in Ifar come “for free”, and we do not need to pay for them in
the privacy analysis. Intuitively, the reason is that in these time steps we have that both fi(S) and
fi(S
′) are very far from the threshold t, and in both executions, with overwhelming probability, we
will get that ai = ⊥.
For time steps in Ialmost we do need to pay in the privacy analysis (by arguing about the noises
that we add to the values of the queries). What we show, however, is that there cannot be too many
of these time steps. Intuitively, in every time step i ∈ Ialmost there is a noticeable probability of
returning ai = ⊤, in which case i = i∗ and there are no indices larger than i in Ialmost. Therefore,
there could not be too many indices i in Ialmost, and the price we pay for them in the privacy
analysis is acceptable.
Challenge in the analysis. The partition of the time steps into Ifar and Ialmost depends on i
∗,
which depends on the noises that we add to the values of the queries at each time step. This means
that conditioning on i∗ (or on Ifar and Ialmost) changes the distribution of these noises. Can we
still use them to argue about the privacy costs of the time steps in Ialmost?
Resolution. We overcome this issue using the following trick. Instead of adding a single (Laplace)
noise to the value of each query, we add two independent noises: fˆi ← fi(S)+wi+vi, where wi and
vi are independent random noises, sampled from the Laplace distribution. This allows us to define
the partition of the time steps based on the wi’s, while arguing about the privacy loss based on the
vi’s. So now time steps in Ifar are time steps i such that fi(S)+wi ≪ t. Even when conditioning on
that, vi is still distributed according to the Laplace distribution, and hence, can mask the difference
between fi(S) and fi(S
′) (as is standard in the literature of differential privacy).
Challenge in the analysis. Do time steps in Ifar really come for free?
Resolution. As we described it, in these time steps, with overwhelming probability over sampling
vi we have that ai = ⊥ (in both executions). This can be used to show that these time steps
increase our privacy parameter δ by at most a factor of m, where m bounds the total number
of time steps. While this privacy loss is not too bad (since δ is typically negligible), we want to
avoid it. In particular, the privacy guarantees of the standard AboveThreshold algorithm do not
depend on the number of time steps m, and we would like to preserve this benefit in our analysis.
To achieve this we modify the distribution of the noises vi (by capping them at a certain value)
in order to make sure that for the vast majority of time steps i ∈ Ifar we have that ai = ⊥ with
probability one during both executions (over sampling vi). This means that the vast majority of
time steps in Ifar really come for free (in terms of the privacy analysis). This allows us to avoid
blowing up the privacy parameter δ by a factor of m. In addition, we show that this modification
to the distribution of the vi’s does not break our privacy analysis for time steps i ∈ Ialmost.
Remark 1.2. In the actual constriction, instead of deleting elements from the data after the first
time they “contribute” to a ⊤ answer, we delete them only after their kth contribution (for a given
parameter k ∈ N). We show that this degrades the privacy guarantees of our algorithm by at most
a factor of ≈ √k. In fact, somewhat surprisingly, for k ≤ log 1δ we show that deleting an element
after its kth contribution comes for free in the sense that it does not degrade the privacy guarantees
of our algorithm. For larger values of k we use composition arguments to show that the additional
privacy loss is at most ≈ √k.
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We also extend the construction to handle linear queries, i.e., queries that range over [0, 1]
(rather than {0, 1}). This means that the “contribution” of a data element to the value of a query
is not binary as we presented it here in the introduction.
1.3 Related works
Mostly related to our work are the works on the sparse vector technique and its variants [11, 16,
6, 22, 5]. Another related work is the recent work of Feldman and Zrnic [14], who presented a
refinement of standard composition theorems, in which they account separately for the privacy
loss of different data elements, and delete elements from the data once they exhaust their privacy
budget.
2 Preliminaries
Notation. Databases S, S′ are called neighboring if one is obtained from the other by adding or
deleting one element, e.g., S′ = S ∪ {x′}. For two random variables Y,Z we write X ≈(ε,δ) Y to
mean that for every event F it holds that
Pr[X ∈ F ] ≤ eε · Pr[Y ∈ F ] + δ, and Pr[Y ∈ F ] ≤ eε · Pr[X ∈ F ] + δ.
The Laplace mechanism. The most basic constructions of differentially private algorithms are
via the Laplace mechanism as follows.
Definition 2.1 (The Laplace Distribution). A random variable has probability distribution Lap(b)
if its probability density function is f(x) = 12b exp
(
− |x|b
)
, where x ∈ R.
Definition 2.2 (Sensitivity). A function f that maps databases to the reals has sensitivity k if for
every neighboring S, S′, it holds that |f(S)− f(S′)| ≤ k.
Theorem 2.3 (The Laplace Mechanism [10]). Let f be a function that maps databases to the reals
with sensitivity k. The mechanism A that on input S adds noise with distribution Lap(kε ) to the
output of f(S) preserves (ε, 0)-differential privacy.
Differential privacy for interactive mechanisms. In this work we consider interactive mech-
anisms that answer queries presented by a data analyst (or an adversary). Informally, an interactive
mechanism M is said to be differentially private, if for every adversary A that interacts with M , it
holds that the algorithm that simulates A and M interacting, and then outputs the transcript of
the interaction, is differentially private. We give here a definition presented by [5].
Definition 2.4 (Differential Privacy for Interactive Mechanisms [10, 5]). Let M be a mechanism
that takes an input database and answers adaptively chosen queries (by an adversary A from some
family Q of possible queries). Mechanism M is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private if for every adversary A
we have that AdaptiveA⇄M (defined below) is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private.
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Algorithm 1 AdaptiveA⇄M
Input: Database S.
1. The database S is given to the mechanism M .
2. For i = 1, 2, . . .
(a) The adversary A chooses a query qi ∈ Q.
(b) The mechanism M is given qi and returns ai.
(c) ai is given to A.
3. When M halts or A halts, output (q1, a1, q2, a2, · · · ).
Algorithm AboveThreshold. Consider an adaptively chosen stream of low-sensitivity functions
f1, f2, . . . which given one by one to a data curator (holding a database S). Algorithm AboveThreshold
of Dwork et al. [11] is a differentially private tool for identifying the first index i such that the value
of fi(S) is “large”.
Algorithm 2 AboveThreshold
Input: Database S ∈ X∗, privacy parameter ε, threshold t, and an adaptively chosen stream of
sensitivity-1 queries fi : X
∗ → R.
1. Let tˆ← t+ Lap(2ε ).
2. In each round i, when receiving a query fi, do the following:
(a) Let fˆi ← fi(S) + Lap(4ε ).
(b) If fˆi ≥ tˆ, then output ⊤ and halt.
(c) Otherwise, output ⊥ and proceed to the next iteration.
Notice that the number of possible rounds unbounded. Nevertheless, this process preserves
differential privacy:
Theorem 2.5 ([11, 16]). Algorithm AboveThreshold is (ε, 0)-differentially private.
3 Algorithm ThresholdMonitor and its Analysis
In this section we present out main result – Algorithm ThresholdMonitor, presented in Algo-
rithm 3. The utility properties of the algorithm are straightforward (follow form a simple union
bound on the magnitude of the noises throughout the execution).
Theorem 3.1. Consider an execution of ThresholdMonitor on a database S and on a stream of
m adaptively chosen queries: f1, f2, . . . , fm. Let Si denote the database S as it is before answering
the ith query. With probability at least 1− β,
1. For every i such that ai = ⊤ it holds that fi(Si) ≥ t− O˜
(
1
ε log
(
1
δ
)
log
(
m
β
))
.
2. For every i such that ai = ⊥ it holds that fi(Si) ≤ t+ O˜
(
1
ε log
(
1
δ
)
log
(
m
β
))
.
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Algorithm 3 ThresholdMonitor
Input: Database S ∈ X∗, privacy parameters ε, δ, threshold t, parameter k, and an adaptively
chosen stream of counting queries fi : X → [0, 1].
1. Initiate a counter c(x) = 0 for every x ∈ X.
2. Denote ∆ = 1ε log
(
1
δ
)
log
(
1
ε log
1
δ
)
.
3. In each round i, when receiving a query fi, do the following:
(a) Let wi ← Lap (10∆) and let vi ← Lap(1ε log 1δ ).
(b) Denote vi = min {vi,∆}.
(c) Let fˆi = fi(S) + wi + vi.
(d) If fˆi < t, then output ai = ⊥.
(e) Otherwise:
• Output ai = ⊤.
• For every x ∈ X set c(x)← c(x) + fi(x).
• Delete from S every element x such that c(x) ≥ k.
(f) Proceed to the next iteration.
We now present the privacy guarantees of the algorithm. Note that, as with AboveThreshold,
the number of possible rounds unbounded. Nevertheless, the algorithm preserves differential pri-
vacy:
Theorem 3.2. Algorithm ThresholdMonitor is (ξ, 3δ)-differentially private, for ξ = 75(k+1)ε
log 1
δ
+25ε.
In particular, for k = log 1δ we have that algorithm ThresholdMonitor is (O(ε), 3δ)-differentially
private.
Proof. Let B : Xn → {⊥,⊤}∗ denote the function that simulates ThresholdMonitor interacting
with a given adversary A (cf. algorithm 1) and returns the transcript. Without loss of generality, we
may assume that our adversary is deterministic.1 Fix two neighboring databases S and S′ = S∪{x′}
for some x′ ∈ X, and let Si (or S′i) denote the database S (or S′) as it is before answering the ith
query during the execution on S (or on S′). Also let ci(·) denote the counter c(·) as it is after the
ith iteration. Denote ∆ = 1ε log
(
1
δ
)
log
(
1
ε log
1
δ
)
. We need the following definition.
Definition 3.3. We say that an almost-top occurs at time step i if ai = ⊥ and ci(x′) < k and
fi(Si) + wi ≥ t− 2∆.
Intuitively, almost-tops are time steps in which the noisy value of the query fˆi almost crossed
the threshold t, but did not, before the iteration in which c(x′) ≥ k. (This intuitive explanation
is somewhat inaccurate because definition of almost-tops only takes into account the noise wi,
1Say that for every deterministic adversary we have that Pr[B(S) ∈ F ] ≤ eε ·Pr[B(S′) ∈ F ]+ δ. Now for a random
adversary, let r denote a possible fixture of its random coins. It holds that Pr[B(S) ∈ F ] =
∑
r Pr[r] Pr[B(S) ∈ F |r] ≤∑
r Pr[r](e
ε · Pr[B(S′) ∈ F |r] + δ) = eε · Pr[B(S′) ∈ F ] + δ.
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without the noise vi.) We also identify the following subset of almost-tops, which we call special-
almost-tops. In the introduction we mentioned that the vast majority of the time steps i for which
fi(Si) + wi ≪ t come “for free” in terms of the privacy analysis. Intuitively, special-almost-tops
represent the small portion of these time steps that do not come for free.
Definition 3.4. We say that a special-almost-top occurs at time step i if ai = ⊥ and ci(x′) < k
and
t− fi(x′)−∆ ≤ fi(Si) + wi < t−∆.
We define the following events.
Event E1:
∑
i: almost-top
fi(x
′) ≤ 15(k + 1) + 5· log 1
δ
Event E2: |{i : special-almost-top}| ≤ 30(k + 1) + 10· log 1
δ
Event E3: E3 = E1 ∧ E2
Lemma 3.5. Consider the execution of B(S). Event E3 occurs with probability at least 1− 3δ.
The formal proof of Lemma 3.5 is given in the appendix. Here we only sketch the argument.
Proof sketch. Let i∗ denote the first time step such that ci∗(x
′) ≥ k. Recall that each wi is sampled
from Lap(10∆). Hence, in every time step i, the probability that fi(Si) + wi ≥ t − 2∆ is not
much larger than the probability that fi(Si) + wi ≥ t + 2∆, in which case ai = ⊤ with high
probability (because vi is sampled from Lap(b) for b≪ ∆). This means that the probability of an
almost-top occurring in some time step i is not much larger then the probability of a top occurring
in this time step. Hence, it is very unlikely that
∑
i: almost-top fi(x
′) would be much bigger than∑
i≤i∗: ai=⊤
fi(x
′), which is bounded by k + 1 by definition of i∗. This argument can be formalized
to show that Event E1 occurs with high probability.
For Event E2, recall that for a time step i to be a special-almost-top, the noise wi must satisfy
wi ∈ [t− fi(x′)−∆, t−∆], which happens with probability at most fi(x′), even conditioned on
this time step being a (non-special) almost-top. (This is true by the properties of the Laplace
distribution.) Therefore, the expected number of special-almost-tops is at most
∑
i: almost-top fi(x
′),
which is at most 15(k + 1) + 5· log 1δ with high probability. Using standard concentration bounds,
this shows that Event E2 occurs with high probability.
We continue with the proof of Theorem 3.2. Observe that, since we assume that our adversary
is deterministic, every query fi is completely determined by the values of the previous answers
a1, . . . , ai−1. We also use the following notation.
Notation 3.6. Given a possible outcome vector ~a ∈ {⊥,⊤}∗, we write f~a,i to denote the query
chosen by the adversary after seeing the first i− 1 answers in ~a.
An important thing to note is that the outcome vector ~a and the noise vector W = (w1, w2, . . . )
completely determine whether E3 occurs. The following lemma is a key in our analysis.
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Lemma 3.7. The following holds for every outcome vector ~a ∈ {⊥,⊤}∗ and noise vector W =
(w1, w2, . . . ) for which event E3 occurs. Let i
∗= i∗(~a) denote the first time step such that ci∗(x
′) ≥ k.
Let Itop = Itop(~a) denote the set of all time steps i ≤ i∗ such that ai = ⊤. Let W ′ denote
a vector identical to W , except that every coordinate i ∈ Itop is decreased by f~a,i(x′). That is,
w′i = wi − f~a,i(x′) for every i ∈ Itop, and w′i = wi for every other index i. Then,
Pr
[B(S′) = ~a ∣∣W ′ ] ≤ Pr [B(S) = ~a |W ] ≤ exp(75(k + 1)ε
log 1δ
+ 25ε
)
· Pr [B(S′) = ~a |W ] .
(Note that since we fixed W and W ′, these probabilities are only over the noises vi.)
We first show how Theorem 3.2 follows from Lemma 3.7 (the proof of Lemma 3.7 is given
afterwards). For simplicity we will assume that the noise vector W is discrete; the analysis could
be extended to handle continues vectors W .2 Let F ⊆ {⊥,⊤}∗ be a set of possible outcomes.
Denote ξ = 75(k+1)ε
log 1
δ
+ 25ε. We have that
Pr[B(S) ∈ F ] ≤ 3δ + Pr[B(S) ∈ F ∧ E3]
= 3δ +
∑
~a∈F
Pr[B(S) = ~a ∧ E3]
= 3δ +
∑
~a∈F
∑
W
Pr[W ] · Pr[B(S) = ~a ∧ E3 | W ]
= 3δ +
∑
~a∈F
∑
W :
E3 occurs
for ~a,W
Pr[W ] · Pr[B(S) = ~a |W ]
≤ 3δ +
∑
~a∈F
∑
W :
E3 occurs
for ~a,W
Pr[W ] · eξ · Pr[B(S′) = ~a |W ] (1)
≤ 3δ +
∑
~a∈F
∑
W
Pr[W ] · eξ · Pr[B(S′) = ~a |W ]
= 3δ + eξ · Pr[B(S′) ∈ F ],
where (1) follows from Lemma 3.7. The other direction is similar, except that we also need to
argue about replacing W with W ′. Recall that each W ′ is obtained from W by decreasing wi by
f~a,i(x
′) for every coordinate i ∈ Itop. Recall that by Step 3e of the algorithm (and by definition of
Itop) we have that
∑
i∈Itop
f~a,i(x
′) ≤ k+1. Also recall that every wi is sampled from Lap(10∆) for
∆ = 1ε log
(
1
δ
)
log
(
1
ε log
1
δ
)
. Therefore, for every such vector W and its corresponding vector W ′ we
2In fact, focusing on discrete vectors W is without loss of generality, since we may round each coordinate of W ,
and each value fi(x), to the nearest multiplication of 1/N , for some N ≥ n. This changes the value of every query
fi(S) by at most 1, which has basically no effect on the utility of the algorithm (since the noise we add to every fi(S)
has variance much larger than 1).
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have
Pr[W ] =
 ∏
i∈Itop
Pr[wi]
 ·
 ∏
i/∈Itop
Pr[wi]

≥
 ∏
i∈Itop
e−f~a,i(x
′)/(10∆) · Pr[w′i]
 ·
 ∏
i/∈Itop
Pr[wi]

= exp
− 1
10∆
∑
i∈Itop
f~a,i(x
′)
 · Pr[W ′]
≥ exp
(
−k + 1
10∆
)
· Pr[W ′]
≥ e−ξ · Pr[W ′]. (2)
Hence,
Pr[B(S) ∈ F ] ≥ Pr[B(S) ∈ F ∧ E3]
=
∑
~a∈F
Pr[B(S) = ~a ∧ E3]
=
∑
~a∈F
∑
W
Pr[W ] · Pr[B(S) = ~a ∧ E3 |W ]
=
∑
~a∈F
∑
W :
E3 occurs
for ~a,W
Pr[W ] · Pr[B(S) = ~a | W ]
≥
∑
~a∈F
∑
W :
E3 occurs
for ~a,W
e−ξ · Pr[W ′] · Pr[B(S′) = ~a | W ′] (3)
=
∑
~a∈F
∑
W :
E3 occurs
for ~a,W ′
e−ξ · Pr[W ′] · Pr[B(S′) = ~a | W ′] (4)
= e−ξ ·
∑
~a∈F
∑
W
Pr[W ′] · Pr[B(S′) = ~a ∧ E3 |W ′]
= e−ξ ·
∑
~a∈F
Pr[B(S′) = ~a ∧ E3]
= e−ξ · Pr[B(S′) ∈ F ∧ E3]
≥ e−ξ · Pr[B(S′) ∈ F ∧ E3] + e−ξ · Pr[B(S′) ∈ F ∧ E3]− e−ξ · 3δ
= e−ξ · Pr[B(S′) ∈ F ]− e−ξ · 3δ,
where (3) follows from Lemma 3.7 and from Inequality (2), and where (4) holds because E3 occurs
for ~a,W if and only if it occurs for ~a,W ′. Specifically, E3 is determined from ~a (the set Itop is
also determined from ~a) and from {wi : i /∈ Itop}, regardless of the value of the wi’s in Itop. This
completes the proof of Theorem 3.2 using Lemma 3.7.
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It remains to prove Lemma 3.7.
Proof of Lemma 3.7. Fix an outcome vector ~a and a vector of noises W = (w1, w2, . . . ) for which
Event E3 occurs. Let i
∗ = i∗(~a) denote the first time step such that ci∗(x
′) ≥ k. This is the time
step in which x′ is deleted from the data. Denote ∆ = 1ε log
(
1
δ
)
log
(
1
ε log
1
δ
)
. Consider the following
partition of the time steps (this partition depends on ~a and W ):
Itop All indices i ≤ i∗ such that ai = ⊤
Iafter All indices i > i
∗
Ifar All indices i ≤ i∗ such that ai = ⊥ and f~a,i(S) + wi < t− f~a,i(x′)−∆
Ispecial-almost All indices i ≤ i∗ such that ai = ⊥ and t− f~a,i(x′)−∆ ≤ f~a,i(Si) + wi < t−∆
Iupper-almost All indices i ≤ i∗ such that ai = ⊥ and f~a,i(S) + wi ≥ t−∆
Recall that we write W ′ to denote a vector identical to W , except that coordinates i ∈ Itop are
decreased by f~a,i(x
′). For convenience, let B = B(S) and B′ = B(S′). We may now decompose
Pr [B(S) = ~a |W ] = Pr [(B1,B2, . . . ) = (a1, a2, . . . ) |W ]
=
∏
i=1,2,...
Pr [Bi = ai |(B1, . . . ,Bi−1) = (a1, . . . , ai−1) ∧W ]
=
∏
i∈Itop
Pr [Bi = ai |(B1, . . . ,Bi−1) = (a1, . . . , ai−1) ∧W ]
·
∏
i∈Iafter
Pr [Bi = ai |(B1, . . . ,Bi−1) = (a1, . . . , ai−1) ∧W ]
·
∏
i∈Ifar
Pr [Bi = ai |(B1, . . . ,Bi−1) = (a1, . . . , ai−1) ∧W ]
·
∏
i∈Ispecial-almost
Pr [Bi = ai |(B1, . . . ,Bi−1) = (a1, . . . , ai−1) ∧W ]
·
∏
i∈Iupper-almost
Pr [Bi = ai |(B1, . . . ,Bi−1) = (a1, . . . , ai−1) ∧W ] (5)
We next analyze each of the expressions in Equality (5) separately, and relate them to the
corresponding expressions with S′ instead of S. Recall that we need to bound these expressions
both from above and from below.
Analysis for i ∈ Itop. Recall that S
′ = S ∪ {x′}, and that f~a,i(S′i) = f~a,i(Si) + f~a,i(x′) for every
i ∈ Itop. Therefore, for every i ∈ Itop we have
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Pr [Bi = ai |(B1, . . . ,Bi−1) = (a1, . . . , ai−1) ∧W ]
= Pr [Bi = ⊤ |(B1, . . . ,Bi−1) = (a1, . . . , ai−1) ∧W ]
= Pr
vi
[
f~a,i(Si) + wi + vi ≥ t
]
= Pr
vi
[
f~a,i(S
′
i)− f~a,i(x′) + wi + vi ≥ t
]
= Pr
[B′i = ai ∣∣(B′1, . . . ,B′i−1) = (a1, . . . , ai−1) ∧W ′ ] ,
Observe that one of the directions holds also without replacing W with W ′. Specifically,
Pr [Bi = ai |(B1, . . . ,Bi−1) = (a1, . . . , ai−1) ∧W ]
= Pr [Bi = ⊤ |(B1, . . . ,Bi−1) = (a1, . . . , ai−1) ∧W ]
= Pr
vi
[
f~a,i(Si) + wi + vi ≥ t
]
≤ Pr
vi
[
f~a,i(S
′
i) + wi + vi ≥ t
]
= Pr
[B′i = ai ∣∣(B′1, . . . ,B′i−1) = (a1, . . . , ai−1) ∧W ] .
Analysis for i ∈ Iafter. Recall that during the execution on S
′ we have that x′ is deleted from
the input database during time i = i∗. Therefore, for every i > i∗ we have that Si = S
′
i. Hence,
∏
i∈Iafter
Pr [Bi = ai |(B1, . . . ,Bi−1) = (a1, . . . , ai−1) ∧W ]
=
 ∏
i∈Iafter
ai=⊥
Pr
vi
[
f~a,i(Si) + wi + vi < t
] ·
 ∏
i∈Iafter
ai=⊤
Pr
vi
[
f~a,i(Si) + wi + vi ≥ t
]
=
 ∏
i∈Iafter
ai=⊥
Pr
vi
[
f~a,i(S
′
i) + wi + vi < t
] ·
 ∏
i∈Iafter
ai=⊤
Pr
vi
[
f~a,i(S
′
i) + wi + vi ≥ t
]
=
∏
i∈Iafter
Pr
[B′i = ai ∣∣(B′1, . . . ,B′i−1) = (a1, . . . , ai−1) ∧W ]
=
∏
i∈Iafter
Pr
[B′i = ai ∣∣(B′1, . . . ,B′i−1) = (a1, . . . , ai−1) ∧W ′ ] ,
where the last equality is because once we fix (a1, . . . , ai−1) and wi then B′i is independent of wj
for j 6= i (it depends only on vi).
Analysis for i ∈ Ifar. For every i ∈ Ifar we have that f~a,i(Si)+wi < t− f~a,i(x′)−∆. Therefore,
we also have that
f~a,i(S
′
i) + wi = f~a,i(Si) + f~a,i(x
′) + wi < t−∆.
Recall that, by definition, vi is always at most ∆. Hence,
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∏
i∈Ifar
Pr [Bi = ai |(B1, . . . ,Bi−1) = (a1, . . . , ai−1) ∧W ]
=
∏
i∈Ifar
Pr [Bi = ⊥ |(B1, . . . ,Bi−1) = (a1, . . . , ai−1) ∧W ]
=
∏
i∈Ifar
Pr
vi
[
f~a,i(Si) + wi + vi < t
]
= 1
=
∏
i∈Ifar
Pr
vi
[
f~a,i(S
′
i) + wi + vi < t
]
=
∏
i∈Ifar
Pr
[B′i = ai ∣∣(B′1, . . . ,B′i−1) = (a1, . . . , ai−1) ∧W ]
=
∏
i∈Ifar
Pr
[B′i = ai ∣∣(B′1, . . . ,B′i−1) = (a1, . . . , ai−1) ∧W ′ ] .
Analysis for i ∈ Ispecial-almost. First observe that
∏
i∈Ispecial-almost
Pr [Bi = ai |(B1, . . . ,Bi−1) = (a1, . . . , ai−1) ∧W ]
=
∏
i∈Ispecial-almost
Pr [Bi = ⊥ |(B1, . . . ,Bi−1) = (a1, . . . , ai−1) ∧W ]
=
∏
i∈Ispecial-almost
Pr
vi
[
f~a,i(Si) + wi + vi < t
]
≥
∏
i∈Ispecial-almost
Pr
vi
[
f~a,i(S
′
i) + wi + vi < t
]
=
∏
i∈Ispecial-almost
Pr
[B′i = ai ∣∣(B′1, . . . ,B′i−1) = (a1, . . . , ai−1) ∧W ]
=
∏
i∈Ispecial-almost
Pr
[B′i = ai ∣∣(B′1, . . . ,B′i−1) = (a1, . . . , ai−1) ∧W ′ ] .
For the other direction, fix i ∈ Ispecial-almost. Recall that vi is sampled from Lap(1ε log 1δ ), and
that we denote ∆ = 1ε log
(
1
δ
)
log
(
1
ε log
1
δ
)
. Using the fact that eγ · (1− γ2 ) ≥ 1 for every 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1
we have that
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Pr [Bi = ai |(B1, . . . ,Bi−1) = (a1, . . . , ai−1) ∧W ]
≤ 1
≤ eε/ log 1δ ·
(
1− ε
2 log 1δ
)
≤ eε/ log 1δ · Pr
vi
[vi < ∆]
≤ eε/ log 1δ · Pr
vi
[
f~a,i(Si) + wi + vi < t
]
(6)
≤ eε/ log 1δ · eε/ log 1δ · Pr
vi
[
f~a,i(S
′
i) + wi + vi < t
]
≤ e2ε/ log 1δ · Pr
vi
[
f~a,i(S
′
i) + wi + vi < t
]
= e2ε/ log
1
δ · Pr [B′i = ai ∣∣(B′1, . . . ,B′i−1) = (a1, . . . , ai−1) ∧W ] ,
where (6) follows since for i ∈ Ispecial-almost we have that f~a,i(Si)+wi+∆ < t, and hence, if vi < ∆
then f~a,i(Si) + wi + vi < t. Now, by Event E2 we have that |Ispecial-almost| ≤ 30(k + 1) + 10 log 1δ ,
and therefore,
∏
i∈Ispecial-almost
Pr [Bi = ai |(B1, . . . ,Bi−1) = (a1, . . . , ai−1) ∧W ]
≤
∏
i∈Ispecial-almost
e2ε/ log
1
δ · Pr [B′i = ai ∣∣(B′1, . . . ,B′i−1) = (a1, . . . , ai−1) ∧W ]
≤ exp
(
60(k + 1)ε
log 1δ
+ 20ε
)
·
∏
i∈Ispecial-almost
Pr
[B′i = ai ∣∣(B′1, . . . ,B′i−1) = (a1, . . . , ai−1) ∧W ] .
Analysis for i ∈ Iupper-almost. As in the analysis for i ∈ Ispecial-almost, we have that
∏
i∈Iupper-almost
Pr [Bi = ai |(B1, . . . ,Bi−1) = (a1, . . . , ai−1) ∧W ]
≥
∏
i∈Iupper-almost
Pr
[B′i = ai ∣∣(B′1, . . . ,B′i−1) = (a1, . . . , ai−1) ∧W ]
=
∏
i∈Iupper-almost
Pr
[B′i = ai ∣∣(B′1, . . . ,B′i−1) = (a1, . . . , ai−1) ∧W ′ ] .
For the other direction,
14
∏
i∈Iupper-almost
Pr [Bi = ai |(B1, . . . ,Bi−1) = (a1, . . . , ai−1) ∧W ]
=
∏
i∈Iupper-almost
Pr [Bi = ⊥ |(B1, . . . ,Bi−1) = (a1, . . . , ai−1) ∧W ]
=
∏
i∈Iupper-almost
Pr
vi
[
f~a,i(Si) + wi + vi < t
]
=
∏
i∈Iupper-almost
Pr
[
f~a,i(Si) + wi + vi < t
]
(7)
≤
∏
i∈Iupper-almost
ef~a,i(x
′)·ε/ log 1
δ · Pr [f~a,i(Si) + f~a,i(x′) + wi + vi < t]
=
∏
i∈Iupper-almost
ef~a,i(x
′)·ε/ log 1
δ · Pr [f~a,i(S′i) + wi + vi < t]
≤
∏
i∈Iupper-almost
ef~a,i(x
′)·ε/ log 1
δ · Pr [f~a,i(S′i) + wi + vi < t]
=
∏
i∈Iupper-almost
ef~a,i(x
′)·ε/ log 1
δ · Pr [B′i = ai ∣∣(B′1, . . . ,B′i−1) = (a1, . . . , ai−1) ∧W ]
= exp
 ∑
i∈Iupper-almost
f~a,i(x
′) · ε
log(1/δ)
 · ∏
i∈Iupper-almost
Pr
[B′i = ai ∣∣(B′1, . . . ,B′i−1) = (a1, . . . , ai−1) ∧W ]
≤ exp
(
15ε(k + 1)
log(1/δ)
+ 5ε
)
·
∏
i∈Iupper-almost
Pr
[B′i = ai ∣∣(B′1, . . . ,B′i−1) = (a1, . . . , ai−1) ∧W ] ,
(8)
where (8) follows from Event E1, and where (7) holds since vi = min {vi, ∆} and since for i ∈
Iupper-almost we have f~a,i(S)+wi+∆ ≥ t. Hence, if f~a,i(Si)+wi+ vi < t then f~a,i(Si)+wi+ vi < t.
This concludes the analysis of the different expressions in Equality (5). Returning to Equal-
ity (5), we now get that
Pr
[B(S′) = ~a ∣∣W ′ ] ≤ Pr [B(S) = ~a |W ] ≤ exp(75(k + 1)ε
log 1δ
+ 25ε
)
· Pr [B(S′) = ~a |W ] .
This completes the proof of Lemma 3.7.
4 Composition for k tops
The analysis in Section 3 shows that when we execute algorithm ThresholdMonitor with a pa-
rameter k, then the privacy guarantees of the algorithm degrade at most linearly with k/ log 1δ . In
this section we present an alternative analysis, showing that the privacy guarantees degrade only
(roughly) proportionally to
√
k. Specifically,
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Theorem 4.1. Algorithm ThresholdMonitor with parameter k is (ε0, 3kδ)-differentially private
for ε0 = O
(√
kε+ kε2
)
.
We begin with a short proof overview (the formal proof is given afterwards).
Proof overview. Fix two neighboring databases S, S′. We want to show that the outcome
distributions of ThresholdMonitor(S) and ThresholdMonitor(S′) are similar. To that end, we
“break” algorithm algorithm ThresholdMonitor into several “smaller” components, analyze the
privacy guarantees of each component, and then argue about the overall privacy guarantees of
ThresholdMonitor using composition theorems. Technically, the definition of these components
depends on S and S′, but this still allows the argument to go through. These components should
not be thought of as standalone algorithms (they only exist as part of the proof of Theorem 4.1).
Before presenting the formal proof, we state the necessary preliminaries regarding adaptive
composition for differential privacy [12]. Let ε, δ be parameters. For b ∈ {0, 1}, define the following
ℓ-round game against an adversary A, denoted as Experimentbℓ,ε,δ(A).
Experimentbℓ,ε,δ(A)
1. For i = 1, . . . , ℓ:
(a) The adversary A outputs two distributions D0i and D1i such that D0i ≈(ε,δ) D1i .
(b) The adversary receives a sample yi ∼ Dbi .
2. Output (y1, . . . , yℓ) and the internal randomness of the adversary A.
In every round of this experiment, the adversary specifics two (similar) distributions D0i and D1i
and gets a sample from Dbi . Intuitively, the adversary’s goal is to guess the bit b. However, since
it is restricted to choose distributions D0i and D1i such that D0i ≈(ε,δ) D1i , then its ability to guess
the bit b is limited. Formally, the following theorem states that A’s view of the experiment (and
in particular, A’s guess for b) is distributed roughly the same for both values of b.
Theorem 4.2 ([12]). For every ε, δ, δˆ ≥ 0, every ℓ ∈ N, and every adversary A it holds that
Experiment0ℓ,ε,δ(A) ≈(εˆ,ℓδ+δˆ) Experiment1ℓ,ε,δ(A),
where εˆ =
√
2ℓ ln
(
1
δˆ
)
· ε+ ℓε(eε − 1).
We are now ready to present the proof of Theorem 4.1.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Fix two neighboring databases S and S′ = S ∪ {x′} for some x′ ∈ X. We
partition the execution of ThresholdMonitor into ℓ = k/ log 1δ epochs based on the value of the
counter c(x′), where x′ is the data element that appears in S′ but not in S. Informally, during each
epoch, the value of c(x′) lies within an interval of length log 1δ , which ensures that the outcome
distribution of each epoch is similar when executing on S or on S′ (as in Section 3). Theorem 4.1
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Algorithm 4 TMx′
Input: Database D ∈ X∗, privacy parameters ε, δ, threshold t, parameter k, counter values
c : X → R, and an adaptively chosen stream of counting queries fi : X → [0, 1].
1. Set c(x′)← max{c(x′), k − log 1δ}. Delete from D every element x such that c(x) ≥ k.
2. Denote ∆ = 1ε log
(
1
δ
)
log
(
1
ε log
1
δ
)
.
3. In each round i, when receiving a query fi, do the following:
(a) Let wi ← Lap (10∆) and let vi ← Lap(1ε log 1δ ).
(b) Denote vi = min {vi, ∆}.
(c) Let fˆi = fi(D) + wi + vi.
(d) If fˆi < t, then output ai = ⊥.
(e) Otherwise:
• Output ai = ⊤.
• For every x ∈ X set c(x)← c(x) + fi(x).
• Delete from D every element x such that c(x) ≥ k.
(f) Proceed to the next iteration.
then follows from Theorem 4.2, since ThresholdMonitor can be viewed as the composition of these
epochs.
We now give the formal details. Consider algorithm TMx′ (presented in Algorithm 4). This
algorithm is similar to algorithm ThresholdMonitor, except that the counters c(·) are initialized
differently. (As we mentioned, this algorithm should not be thought of as a standalone algorithm;
it is only part of the analysis.) Observe that in TMx′ we initialize c(x
′) ≥ k − log 1δ , and that x′
is deleted from the data once c(x′) ≥ k. Hence, an identical analysis to that of Section 3 shows
that for every neighboring databases that differ on x′, say D and D′ = D ∪ {x′}, we have that the
outcome distribution of TMx′(D) and of TMx′(D
′) are similar. Specifically, for every adversary A˜
interacting with TMx′ we have that
B˜(D) ≈(O(ε),3δ) B˜(D′),
where B˜ denotes the function that simulates the interaction and returns the transcript (cf. algo-
rithm 1).
Fix an adversary A that interacts with ThresholdMonitor, and let B : Xn → {⊥,⊤}∗ denote
the function that simulates the interaction. We need to show that
B(S) ≈(ε0,3kδ) B(S′).
We now reformulate algorithm B (ie., the interaction between ThresholdMonitor and the ad-
versary A) as ℓ = k/ log 1δ applications of algorithm TMx′ . Specifically,
17
Algorithm TailoredComposition
Input: Database T (where T is either S or S′)
1. Let G = 1, and instantiate a counter c(x) = 0 for every x ∈ X.
2. Instantiate algorithm TMx′ on the database T with the counters c.
3. For i = 1, 2, . . . do
(a) Obtain the next query fi from the adversary A.
(b) Give fi to algorithm TMx′ and obtain an answer ai.
(c) Give ai to the adversary A.
(d) If ai = ⊤ set c(x)← c+ fi(x) for every x ∈ X.
(e) If c(x′) ≥ G · log 1δ and c(x′) < k then
• Set G← G+ 1.
• End the current execution of TMx′ .
• Re-instantiate TMx′(T ) with the counters c.
4. When A halts, output z = (q1, a1, q2, a2, . . . ).
Now observe that TailoredComposition is identical to B, that is, to the function that simulates
ThresholdMonitor (with parameter k) interacting with the adversary A. Specifically, algorithm
TailoredComposition keeps track of the counters c in a way that is identical to the values of these
counters in an execution of ThresholdMonitor, and these counters are given to algorithm TMx′(T )
when it is re-executed. Therefore, in order to show that B(S) ≈(ε0,3kδ) B(S′) it suffices to show
that
TailoredComposition(S) ≈(ε0,3kδ) TailoredComposition(S′).
This follows by mapping algorithm TailoredComposition to the settings of Theorem 4.2 (the
composition theorem). Specifically, for b ∈ {0, 1} and g ∈ {1, 2, . . . , ℓ}, let zbg denote the portion
of the output vector (q1, a1, q2, a2, . . . ) that corresponds to time steps in which G = g during the
execution of TailoredComposition on Sb, where S0 = S and S1 = S
′. Also, for g ∈ {1, 2, . . . , ℓ}
let Zbg be a random variable representing the value of z
b
g. Every such Z
b
g is the outcome of the
interaction between the adversary and a single execution of algorithm TMx′(Sb). Therefore, for
every g ∈ {1, 2, . . . , ℓ} we have that Z0g ≈(O(ε),3δ) Z1g . Thus, by Theorem 4.2 we get that
TailoredComposition(S) = (Z01 , . . . , Z
0
ℓ ) ≈(ε0,3kδ) (Z11 , . . . , Z1ℓ ) = TailoredComposition(S′),
for ε0 = O
(√
kε+ kε2
)
.
5 The Shifting Heavy-Hitters Problem
In the shifting heavy-hitters problem there are n users, a data domain X, and a threshold parameter
t. On every time step i ∈ [m], every user j gets an input xi,j ∈ X, and the goal is to report all the
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current heavy-hitters. That is, on time step i, the goal is to identify all data elements x such that
wi(x) , |{j ∈ [n] : xi,j = x}| ≥ t.
Definition 5.1. We say that an algorithm A solves the shifting heavy-hitters problem with error
parameter ∆ and failure probability β if it guarantees the following with probability at least (1−β):
1. The algorithm never identifies non-heavy elements as being heavy. That is, on every time
step i, if the algorithm identifies an element x then wi(x) ≥ t.
2. On every time step i the algorithm identifies every data element x such that wi(x) ≥ t+∆.
Of course, we want to solve the shifting heavy-hitters problem while guaranteeing differential
privacy. A naive approach for this would be to run a differential private algorithm for histograms
on every time step i ∈ [m]. However, such a solution would have error at least √m because of
composition. This solution can be improved by using the (standard) sparse vector technique in
order to identify the time steps in which a heavy-hitter exists, and only run a private algorithm for
histograms during these identified time steps. However, in general, the number k of time steps in
which a heavy-hitter exists can be quite large (and the error with this approach scales with
√
k).
We present a refined solution in which the error only scales with (the square root of) the maximal
number of times that a single user can hold a heavy-hitter as input. Specifically
Notation 5.2. Let k denote the number of time steps in which a heavy-hitter exists. That is,
k =
∣∣∣∣{i ∈ [m] : maxx∈X {wi(x)} ≥ t
}∣∣∣∣ .
Notation 5.3. Let k∗ denote the maximal number of times that a single user holds a heavy-hitter
as input. That is,
k∗ = max
j∈[n]
|{i ∈ [m] : wi(xi,j) ≥ t}| .
Observe that k∗ is always at most k, and that it can be significantly lower than k. In particular,
it might be that k = n·k∗/t, because we might have n·k∗/t time steps in which a single heavy-hitter
exists (with weight t). Using our techniques from Sections 3 and 4, we get a solution to the shifting
heavy-hitters problem in which the error only scales as ≈
√
k∗.
Theorem 5.4. There exists an (ε, δ)-differentially private algorithm for solving the shifting heavy-
hitters problem with failure probability β and error
∆ = O˜
(√
k˜
ε
· log
(
1
δ
)
· log
(
m · |X|
β
))
,
where k˜ is a (publicly known) upper bound on k∗.
We remark that the assumption that k˜ ≥ k∗ is only used in the utility analysis, and that the
privacy of our algorithm is guaranteed even if this assumption does not hold.
19
Proof sketch. Theorem 5.4 follows by using ThresholdMonitor in order to identify the heavy hitters
on every time step. Specifically, on every time step i ∈ [m] we query ThresholdMonitor with the
functions fx(y) = 1{y=x} for every x ∈ X, and report x as a heavy-hitter if the corresponding
answer is ⊤. The privacy properties of this algorithm follow directly from the privacy properties of
ThresholdMonitor (see Theorem 3.2). The utility guarantees follow from the fact that throughout
the execution we sample at most O(m · |X|) Laplace random variables. By the properties of the
Laplace distribution, with probability at least 1 − β, all of these random variables are at most
∆ = O˜
(√
k˜
ε · log(1δ ) · log(m·|X|β )
)
in absolute value (see Theorem 3.1).
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A Proof of Lemma 3.5
In this section we prove Lemma 3.5, which states that Event E3 occurs with high probability. As
we mentioned, the intuitive explanation is that in every round i, the probability of an almost-top
is roughly the same as the probability of an actual top, and hence, the almost-tops and the actual
tops should be “balanced”. The analysis we give here is an adaptation of the analysis of [15] for a
different scenario.
Towards proving Lemma 3.5, let us consider the following m-round game against an adversary.
A m-round game
In each round i:
1. The adversary chooses 0 ≤ pi ≤ 12 and pi4 ≤ qi ≤ 1 − pi, and γi ∈ [0, 1], possibly
based on the first (i− 1) rounds.
2. A random variable Xi ∈ {0, 1, 2} is sampled (and the outcome is given to the
adversary), where Pr[Xi = 1] = pi and Pr[Xi = 2] = qi and Pr[Xi = 0] = 1−pi−qi.
We refer to the values γi as weights. For k ∈ R and i ∈ [m], let Z(k)i be the indicator for the
event that
i∑
j=1
1{Xj = 2} · γj ≤ k.
That is, Z
(k)
i = 1 if and only if the sum of weights γj for time steps 1 ≤ j ≤ i such that Xj = 2 is
at most k. Note that for k < 0 we have that Z
(k)
i ≡ 0. For k ∈ R let
W (k) =
m∑
i=1
1{Xi = 1} · γi · Z(k)i .
This can be interpreted as follows. Let i∗ denote the first time step in which Z
(k)
i∗ = 0. Then W
(k)
is the sum of weights γi for time steps 1 ≤ i < i∗ in which Xi = 1.
Remark A.1. Intuitively, we can think of k as the “budget” of the adversary – every time that
Xi = 2 then the budget is decreased by γi. The adversary’s goal is to maximize the sum of weights
γi for time steps in which Xi = 1 before the budget runs out. That is, every time that Xi = 1
the adversary gets γi as a “reward” (before the budget runs out), and every time that Xi = 2 the
budget is decreased by γi. The random variable W
(k) represents the sum of rewards obtained by the
adversary before the budget runs out.
Towards analyzing W (k), we define the following partial sums. For j ∈ [m] and k ∈ R, let
W
(k)
j =
m∑
i=j
1{Xi = 1} · γi · Z(k)i .
Observe that W (k) =W
(k)
1 .
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Claim A.2. For every adversary’s strategy, every k ≥ 0, every λ ∈ R, and every j ∈ [m] we have
that Pr[W
(k)
j > λ] ≤ exp
(−λ5 + 3(k + 1)). In particular, Pr[W (k) > λ] ≤ exp (−λ5 + 3(k + 1)).
Proof. The proof is by reverse induction on j. For the base case (j = m) observe that W
(k)
m ∈ [0, 1],
and hence if λ > 1 then Pr[W
(k)
m > λ] = 0. Also observe that if λ ≤ 0 then Pr[W (k)m > λ] ≤ 1 ≤
exp(−λ5 + 3(k + 1)). Assume therefore that 0 < λ ≤ 1. Then,
Pr[W (k)m > λ] = Pr[1{Xm = 1} · γm · Z(k)m > λ]
≤ Pr[Xm = 1]
= pm
≤ 1
2
< exp(−1/5)
≤ exp(−λ/5 + 3(k + 1)).
This completes the analysis for the base case (j = m). Now suppose that for any adversary’s
strategy, for every λ ∈ R, and for every k ≥ 0 it holds that Pr[W (k)j+1 > λ] ≤ exp
(−λ5 + 3(k + 1)).
We will show the same for j. Fix k ≥ 0 and fix λ ∈ R. We may assume that λ > 0, as otherwise
Pr[W
(k)
j > λ] ≤ 1 ≤ exp(−λ5 + 3(k + 1)). Suppose that the adversary chooses pj , qj in round j.
Then,
Pr[W
(k)
j > λ] = Pr[1{Xj = 1} · γj · Z(k)j +W (k)j+1 > λ]
= Pr[Xj = 0] · Pr[1{Xj = 1} · γj · Z(k)j +W (k)j+1 > λ|Xj = 0]
+ Pr[Xj = 1] · Pr[1{Xj = 1} · γj · Z(k)j +W (k)j+1 > λ|Xj = 1]
+ Pr[Xj = 2] · Pr[1{Xj = 1} · γj · Z(k)j +W (k)j+1 > λ|Xj = 2]
≤ Pr[Xj = 0] · Pr[W (k)j+1 > λ]
+ Pr[Xj = 1] · Pr[W (k)j+1 > λ− γj]
+ Pr[Xj = 2] · Pr[W (k−γj)j+1 > λ]
≤ (1− pj − qj) · exp
(
−λ
5
+ 3(k + 1)
)
+ pj · exp
(
−λ− γj
5
+ 3(k + 1)
)
+ qj · exp
(
−λ
5
+ 3(k − γj + 1)
)
(9)
= (1− pj − qj) · exp
(
−λ
5
+ 3(k + 1)
)
+ pj · eγj/5 · exp
(
−λ
5
+ 3(k + 1)
)
+ qj · e−3γj · exp
(
−λ
5
+ 3(k + 1)
)
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=
(
1 + pj
(
eγj/5 − 1
)
+ qj
(
e−3γj − 1)) · exp(−λ
5
+ 3(k + 1)
)
≤
(
1 + pj
(
eγj/5 − 1
)
+
pj
4
(
e−3γj − 1)) · exp(−λ
5
+ 3(k + 1)
)
=
(
1 + pj
(
eγj/5 +
e−3γj
4
− 5
4
))
· exp
(
−λ
5
+ 3(k + 1)
)
≤ exp
(
−λ
5
+ 3(k + 1)
)
. (10)
Inequality (10) follows from the fact that eγ/5 + e
−3γ
4 − 54 ≤ 0 for every γ ∈ [0, 1]. Inequality (9)
follows from the inductive assumption.3
We next show how Lemma 3.5 follows from Claim A.2. Recall that Lemma 3.5 states that
Pr[E3] ≥ 1− 3δ, where E3 = E1 ∧E2. We analyze E1 and E2 separately.
Claim A.3. Pr[E1] ≥ 1− δ.
Proof. To map algorithm ThresholdMonitor to the setting of Claim A.2, recall that we denote
∆ = 1ε log
(
1
δ
)
log
(
1
ε log
1
δ
)
, and consider an execution of ThresholdMonitor. In every round i let
γi = fi(x
′) and define a random variable Xi as follows:
1. If ai = ⊤ then Xi = 2
2. If ai = ⊥ and fi(Si) + wi ≥ t− 2∆ then Xi = 1
3. Otherwise Xi = 0
To apply Claim A.2 we need to show that for every i
Pr[Xi = 1] ≤ 1
2
and Pr[Xi = 2] ≥ 1
4
· Pr[Xi = 1].
Indeed,
Pr[Xi = 1] = Pr [ai = ⊥ and fi(Si) + wi ≥ t− 2∆]
= Pr [fi(Si) + wi + vi < t and fi(Si) + wi ≥ t− 2∆]
= Pr [t− fi(Si)− 2∆ ≤ wi < t− fi(Si)− vi]
≤ Pr[vi < −∆] + Pr [t− fi(Si)− 2∆ ≤ wi < t− fi(Si)− vi|vi ≥ −∆]
≤ 1
4
+ Pr [t− fi(Si)− 2∆ ≤ wi < t− fi(Si) + ∆]
≤ 1
4
+
1
4
=
1
2
,
3For the edge case where −1 ≤ k − γj < 0, in which we cannot apply the inductive assumption, observe that
W
(k−γj)
j+1 ≡ 0 and hence Pr[W
(k−γj)
j+1 > λ] = 0.
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where the last inequality follows from the fact that wi is sampled from Lap(10∆). Also,
Pr[Xi = 2] ≥ Pr[fi(Si) + wi ≥ t− 2∆] · Pr[Xi = 2|fi(Si) + wi ≥ t− 2∆]
≥ Pr[Xi = 1] · Pr[Xi = 2|fi(Si) + wi ≥ t− 2∆]
= Pr[Xi = 1] · Pr[ai = ⊤|fi(Si) + wi ≥ t− 2∆]
= Pr[Xi = 1] · Pr[fi(Si) + wi + vi ≥ t|fi(Si) + wi ≥ t− 2∆]
≥ Pr[Xi = 1] · Pr[vi ≥ −∆] · Pr[fi(Si) + wi + vi ≥ t|fi(Si) + wi ≥ t− 2∆ and vi ≥ −∆]
≥ Pr[Xi = 1] · Pr[vi ≥ −∆] · Pr[wi ≥ t− fi(Si) + ∆|wi ≥ t− fi(Si)− 2∆]
≥ Pr[Xi = 1] · 1
2
· 1
2
= Pr[Xi = 1] · 1
4
,
where the last inequality follows again from the fact that wi is sampled from Lap(10∆). Now, let
i∗ denote the first time step in which k ≤∑i∗i=1 1{Xi = 2} · γi =∑i∗i=1 1{ai = ⊤} · fi(x′). Also let
W =
i∗∑
i=1
1{Xi = 1} · γi =
i∗∑
i=1
1{i is an almost-top} · fi(x′).
By Claim A.2 we have that
Pr[ E1 ] ≤ Pr
[
W ≥ 5 · log 1
δ
+ 15(k + 1)
]
≤ δ.
Claim A.4. Pr[E2] ≥ 1− 2δ.
Proof. Consider an execution of ThresholdMonitor on a database S, and fix a possible outcome
vector ~a = (a1, a2, . . . , am). Recall that ~a determines all of the queries f~a,i throughout the execution.
Note, however, that fixing ~a does not completely determine the noisy values wi throughout the
execution. (Rather, for every query i it only determines whether fˆi < t or not.) Let F1, F2, . . . , Fm ∈
R be random variables denoting the value of w1, w2, . . . , wm, respectively. Observe that, conditioned
on ~a, we have that F1, F2, . . . , Fm are independent. In addition, for every fixture I of the time steps
in which an almost-top occurs, we have that F1, F2, . . . , Fm are conditionally independent given ~a
and I.
Now, let G1, G2, . . . , Gm ∈ {0, 1} be random variables defined as Gi = 1 if a special-almost-top
occurs in time i. As each Gi is a function (only) of Fi, we have that G1, G2, . . . , Gm are also
conditionally independent given ~a and I. Observe that E [
∑
iGi|~a, I] ≤
∑
i∈I f~a,i(x
′), because
every wi is sampled from Lap(10∆), and hence, even conditioned on i being an almost-top, the
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probability that wi falls inside an interval of length f~a,i(x
′) is at most f~a,i(x
′). Therefore,
Pr[E2] = Pr
[
m∑
i=1
Gi ≤ 30(k + 1) + 10 log 1
δ
]
=
∑
~a,I
Pr[~a, I] ·
[
m∑
i=1
Gi ≤ 30(k + 1) + 10 log 1
δ
∣∣∣∣∣~a, I
]
≥
∑
~a,I
Pr[~a, I] ·
[
E1 ∧
m∑
i=1
Gi ≤ 30(k + 1) + 10 log 1
δ
∣∣∣∣∣~a, I
]
=
∑
~a,I
Pr[~a, I] ·
[
E1 ∧
m∑
i=1
Gi ≤ 2 ·max
{∑
i∈I
f~a,i(x
′), 15(k + 1) + 5 log
1
δ
}∣∣∣∣∣~a, I
]
(11)
=
∑
~a,I
Pr[~a, I] ·
[
E1 ∧
m∑
i=1
Gi ≤ 2 ·max
{
E
[∑
Gi
∣∣∣~a, I] , 15(k + 1) + 5 log 1
δ
}∣∣∣∣∣~a, I
]
(12)
≥
∑
~a,I
Pr[~a, I] ·
[
m∑
i=1
Gi ≤ 2 ·max
{
E
[∑
Gi
∣∣∣~a, I] , 15(k + 1) + 5 log 1
δ
}∣∣∣∣∣~a, I
]
− δ (13)
≥
∑
~a,I
Pr[~a, I] · (1− δ) − δ (14)
= 1− 2δ.
Equality (11) holds since whenever E1 occurs we have that
∑
i∈I f~a,i(x
′) ≤ 15(k + 1) + 5 log 1δ .
Equality (12) holds since E [
∑
iGi|~a, I] ≤
∑
i∈I f~a,i(x
′). Inequality (13) holds since Pr[E1] ≥ 1− δ.
Inequality (14) follows from the Chernoff bound.
Lemma 3.5 now follows by combining Claim A.3 and Claim A.4.
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